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Abstract 
 
Freedom of speech is the concept of being able to speak freely without censorship. It is often regarded as an integral concept 
in modern liberal democracies. If the liberty to express oneself is not highly valued, as has often been the case, there is no 
problem : freedom of expression is simply curtailed in favour of other values. Free speech becomes a volatile issue when it is 
highly valued because only then do the limitations placed upon it become controversial. The first thing to note in any sensible 
discussion of freedom of speech is that it well have to be limited. Every society place some limits on the exercise of speech 
because speech always takes place within a context of competing values. Stanley Fish (1994)1 is correct when he says that 
there is no such thing as free speech. Free speech is simply a useful term to focus our attention on a particular form of human 
interaction and the phrase is not meant to suggest that speech should never be interfered with. No society has yet existed 
where speech has not been limited to some extent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The right to freedom of speech is guaranteed under international law through numerous human rights instruments, 
notably under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, although implementation remains lacking in many countries. In South Africa the Bill of Rights in the South 
African Constitution follows the trend in international human rights documents, which restricts the right to freedom of 
expression by prohibiting the incitement of racial discrimination or racial hatred or hostility. 
The synonymous term freedom of expression is sometimes preferred, since the right is not confined to verbal 
speech but is understood to protect only act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas regardless of the 
medium used.2 (Jacobson, 1995). 
In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute in any country, although the degree of freedom varies 
greatly. Industrialized countries also have varying approaches to balance freedom with order. For instance, the United 
States First Amendment theoretically grants absolute freedom, placing the burden upon the state to demonstrate when (if 
ever) censorship is necessary. Canadian law places the burden upon the individual to demonstrate how the speech 
benefits the public (e.g. hate speech is illegal), and the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees freedom 
outside specific circumstances in which it prescribes censorship (e.g. to protect national security). 
In most liberal democracies, it is generally recognized that restrictions should be the exception and free expression 
the rule; nevertheless, compliance with this principle is often lacking. The right to freedom of speech is not a right to 
cause others to live in fear of suffering harm. A decent person knows this and will not speak in ways that threaten others 
who, themselves, do not mean to do any harm. 
 
2. Theoretical Rationale for Freedom of Speech 
 
It is important to understand the various theoretical rationales for freedom of speech if we are to form views about the 
concept’s true nature and its rational limits. In part, the justification for free speech is a general liberal or libertarian 
presumption against coercing individuals from living how they please and doing what they want. However, a number of 
more specific justifications are commonly proposed for freedom of speech. 
                                                                            
1 Stanley Fish, 1994. 
2 Jacobson, 1995). 
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For example, Justice McLachlan of the Canadian Supreme Court identified the following in R. v. Keegstra3, a 1990 
case on hate speech: (1) free speech promotes “The free flow of ideas essential to political democracy and democratic 
institutions” and limits the ability of the state to subvert other rights and freedoms; (2) it promotes a marketplace of ideas, 
in which includes, but is not limited to, the search for truth; (3) it is intrinsically valuable as part of the self-actualisation of 
speakers and listeners; and (4) it is justified by the dangers for good government of allowing its suppression. 
Such reasons perhaps overlap. Together, they provide a widely accepted rationale for the recognition of freedom 
of speech as a basic School of civil liberty. 
Each of these justifications can be elaborated in a variety of ways and some may need to be qualified. The first and 
fourth can be bracketed together as democratic justifications, or a justification relating to self-governance. They relate to 
aspects of free speech’s political role in a democratic society. The second is related to the discovery of truth. The third 
relates most closely to general libertarian values but stresses the particular importance of language, symbolism and 
representation for our lives and autonomy. 
The Constitution of South Africa contains a Bill of Rights which protects certain rights against the unrestricted 
exercise of government powers, and the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and other organs of state – even 
individuals under certain circumstances are bound by the Bill of Rights. 
The right to freedom of expression, which can be regarded as one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society4, is one of the fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
Expression is seen as a means of fulfillment of the human personality, and is closely related to other fundamental 
rights and freedoms, such as freedom of religion, belief and opinion, the right to dignity, the right to freedom of 
association and the right to assembly. One of the goals of freedom of expression is therefore to assist in the democratic 
decision-making and to aid the process of stability and change in society (Burns). 
Section 16 (1) of the South African Constitution protects free expression generally. Freedom of expression includes 
verbal.5 
This analysis suggests a number of conclusions. First, there are powerful overlapping arguments for free speech 
as a basic political principle in any liberal democracy. Second, however, free speech is not a simple and absolute concept 
but a liberty that is justified by even deeper values. Third, the values implicit in the various justifications for free speech 
may not apply equally strongly to all kinds if speech in all circumstances. 
 
3. International and Foreign Law on Free Speech 
 
The right to freedom of expression is universally recognized and most countries if not all impose some form of restrictions 
on that right. International instruments also provide for that right and recognise the need to strike a balance between the 
harm caused by hate speech and restrictions to the freedom of expression. 
The attitude of the international community is spelled out in the Universal Declaration of human Rights, which 
provides for the right to the freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom to compare information and ideas 
through any media. Similarly, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination while 
allowing freedom of expression introduces an obligation on states to declare as a criminal offence the “dissemination of 
ideas based on racial discrimination”. 
A more binding instrument, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, while providing for the 
freedom of expression modifies it by imposing ‘special duties and responsible duties”. Article 20(2)6 of that Covenant 
states that: 
 
“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement or discrimination, hostility or violence 
shall be prohibited by law” 
 
In the European arena the European Commission on Human Rights also allows for the freedom of expression but 
stipulates that the right carries with it duties and responsibilities and is subject to restrictions and penalties as are 
described by law and are necessary in a democratic society. 
 
                                                                            
3 R. v. Keegstra. 
4 Van Wyk, 2002:1. 
5 Section 16 (1) of the South African Constitution. 
6 Article 20(2). 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 23 
November  2014 
          
 1365 
In the Handyside7 case the court stated that this freedom is applicable not only to information or ideas that are 
“favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offends, shock or 
disturb the state or any sector of the population”. 
 
3.1 The Canadian Situation 
 
Hate speech restrictions are also found in other democracies. The Canadian Supreme Court has accepted controls on 
hate speech as legitimate and therefore offers us comparable jurisprudence. In terms of section 2(b)8 of the Canadian 
Charter of rights, everyone is guaranteed the freedom of expression. However hate propaganda is prohibited by the 
Criminal Code, which states that “any person who willfully promotes hatred against “any section of the public 
distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethic origin” commits an offence. There is no reference to “incitement of 
imminent violence.” The Canadian Supreme Court in the Kiegstra judgement dealt with an accused teacher who made 
Anti-Semitic statements to his students. Although he was found guilty (by a narrow on the basis that there was a willful 
promotion of hatred) the court said that the right to freedom of expression covered all messages, “however unpopular, 
distasteful or contrary to the mainstream”. In the same case the court stated that the Criminal Code, which prohibited hate 
speech, was a reasonable and justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression. 
In the landmark Supreme Court of Canada case9, the court struck down a provision in the Criminal Code of 
Canada that prohibited publication of false information or news, stating that it violated section 2(b) of the Charter: 
In April, 2004, a bill was passed which includes as hate speech propaganda against people based or their sexual 
orientation. It is now illegal to publicly incite hatred against people based on their colour, race, religion, ethic origin, and 
sexual orientation. However, under section 319 on hate speech a person cannot be convicted of hate speech “if the 
person can establish that the statements made are true. 
Other laws that protect freedom of speech in Canada, include the Implied Bill of Rights and the Canadian Bill of 
Rights. 
 
3.2 United States 
 
In the United States freedom of expression is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. There 
are several exceptions to this general rule, including copyright protection, the Miller10 test for obscenity and greater 
regulation of so-called commercial speech, such as advertising. The Miller test in particular rarely comes into effect. 
Neither the federal nor state government engages in preliminary censorship of movies. However, the Motion 
Picture Association of America has a rating system, and movies not rated by the MPAA cannot expect anything but a very 
limited release in theatres, making the system almost compulsory. 
Within the U.S., the freedom of speech also varies widely from one state to the next. Of all states, the state of 
California permits its citizens the broadest possible range of free speech under the state constitution (whose declaration 
of rights includes a strong affirmative right to free speech in addition to a negative right paralleling the federal prohibition 
on laws that abridge the freedom of speech). 
More specifically, through the Pruneyard case11 ruling, California residents may peacefully exercise their right to 
free speech in parts of private shopping centres regularly held open to the public. 
 
3.3 South Africa 
 
It is clear that the Bill of Rights in South African Constitution follows the trend in international human rights documents, 
which restricts the right to freedom of expression of prohibiting the incitement of racial discrimination or racial hatred or 
hostility. 
The applicable sections in the South African Constitution have been mentioned in the introduction to these 
findings. The right to the freedom of expression is firmly entrenched.12  
                                                                            
7 Handyside. 
8 Section 2(b). 
9 R v Zundel, 1992. 
10 Miller. 
11 Pruneyard case. 
12 Section 16(1) of the Constitution. 
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In Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs13, a Namibian case, the case held that: 
 
“In order to live and maintain a democratic state the citizens must be free to speak, criticize and praise where praise is 
due. Mutes silence is not an ingredient of a democracy because the exchange of ideas is essential to the development 
of democracy.” 
 
In addition, there are a number of academic writing and cases that have come before our courts in which the 
existence of that right has been reiterated. 
Section (2) modifies that right in the manner spelt out by that subsection. Because this is an exception to the 
general and accepted rule that everyone has the right to freedom of speech, words such as “incitement” and “hate” need 
to be restrictively interpreted. 
In considering the applicability of the expressions to the freedom of expression, the offending statement is looked 
at objectively. Two elements must be present before and expression can be determined to be as hate speech. Firstly, 
there must be an advocacy of hatred on one of the listed grounds (in case, it is race) and secondly there must be 
incitement to cause harm. 
Put differently the enquiry is: 
a. Does the statement advocate hatred; if so 
b. Is such advocacy of hatred based on one of the grounds listed in the section, and, 
c. Does such advocacy constitute incitement to cause harm? 
Incitement, means to call for, urge or persuade. Burns (1991)14 quotes two South African decision relating to the 
Riotous Assemblies in which it was held that “incitement” connotes an element of persuasion by which some measure of 
reluctance or hesitation on the party incites is overcome. It must however, be borne in mind that section 16 (2) (c)15 deals 
with incitement to cause harm. 
The concept of harm generally includes physical violence, and financial and emotional harm. The harm of hate 
speech matters to individuals, to the groups they belong to, to society generally, and to democracy. De Waal, Currie & 
Erasmus16 come to their conclusion despite the fact the categories listed in section 16 (2) ©, constitute exceptions to the 
right conferred in section 16 (1) and that exceptions are usually restrictively interpreted. 
The exercise of answering the above, could involve a single total analysis applying standards, criteria and 
benchmarks. Communicated in the case law, and as informed by International Instruments. 
Justice Black, in Dennis vs. US17 said, 
 
“To qualify to be categorized as hate speech, the objection must be based on more than fear, on more than passionate 
opposition against the speech on more than a revolted dislikes for its contents.” 
 
Section 16(10)18 of the South African Constitution provides for freedom of expression: 
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes – 
 
a. freedom of the press and other media; 
b. freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
c. freedom of artistic creativity; and 
d. academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
Any limitation of this category of expression must satisfy the requirements of the general limitations clause 
contained in section 36(1)19, to be constitutionally valid. 
Section 16(1) of the South African Constitution protects free expressive generally.  
Freedom of expression does not extend to: 
a. propaganda for war; 
b. incitement of imminent violence; or 
                                                                            
13 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs. 
14 Burns, 1991. 
15 Section 16 (2) (c). 
16 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus.  
17 Dennis vs. US.  
18 Section 16(10). 
19 Section 36(1). 
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c. advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement that 
causes harm. 
The internal limitation contained in section 16(2)20 has the effect that parliament can introduce hate speech 
legislation or by regulation for the class of speech listed in section 16(2). Such legislation would not be subject to a 
general limitation analysis in terms of section 36. Since it would not amount to a limitation of the right contained in section 
16(1). In short, a statute prohibiting hate speech as defined in the Constitution, cannot be subject to a freedom of 
expression challenge, because there is not constitutional right to speech of this nature. 
Johannessen (1997:142)21 submits that section 16 (2) is a serious denigration of the right to freedom of expression 
which may be abused by governments to restrict speech. Hate speech22 is moved beyond the scope of constitutional 
scrutiny and of a general limitations analysis, and is moved into the area, of parliamentary supremacy.  
Johannessen argues that if a person were to be prosecuted under a statute which targets speech within the ambit 
of section 16 (2)23, he or she would not be able to rouse as a defense that the law is an unreasonable or unjustifiable 
restriction on the Constitutional freedom of expression, since there is no right that could be infringed. He or she could only 
try to prove that the words in question do not advocate hatred on the grounds listed in the Constitution. 
Burns (1991)24 welcomes the internal limitation as a clear message to all living in South Africa that hate speech 
well not be tolerated. Hate speech is of nature insulting, degrading and of law value and do not advance any of the goals 
of freedom of expression. Hate speech, which is often suggested as synonymous with expressions of racial hatred and 
racism, has a destabilising and diverse effect on society. In encourages discrimination between groups which may lead to 
violence and a breakdown in public order. That is therefore that speech like “we will kill for Zuma” and “we will die and kill 
to defend Zuma” by leaders, cannot be tolerated in a society where speech should be free and not causing harm. From 
the same platform it was said that the government is the target of “people from the right and imperialists”. The ANC youth 
leader’s public attack on ministers during his speech at the Tswane University of Technology is another example of free 
speech that causes harm.  
The Constitutional Court has recently emphasised the interest of the state in regulating hate speech, since hate 
speech may pose harm to the constitutionally mandated objective of building a non-racial and non-sexist society based 
on human dignity and the achievement of equality. (Feinberg, 1995) 
According to section 16 (2)25 of the Constitution the right to freedom of expression does not extend to  
(1) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity or religion, and 
(2) that constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
Both the above elements p the advocacy of hatred and the incitement to cause harm, must be present before an 
expression26 will amount to advocacy of hatred or hate speech. The constitutional test whether speech is to be judged as 
hate speech, can therefore be considered to be a stringent one. 
Ever since the first consideration of the idea of “free speech” it has been agreed that the right to free speech is 
subject to restrictions and exceptions. A well-known example is typified by the statement that free speech does not allow 
falsely “shouting fire in a crowded theatre”27. Other limiting doctrines, including those of libel and obscenity, can also 
recruit freedom of speech. 
South African jurisprudence on hate speech. In Human Rights Commission of South Africa v SABC 28  the 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA) recently enquired whether the broadcast of the song 
“aman Ndiya” amounted to the advocacy of hatred based on race or ethnicity that constitutes incitement to harm, which is 
prohibited in terms of the Constitution and the Broadcasting Code. The broadcast of the song, and not the distribution of 
the CD or live performances of the song, was at state. The Human Rights Commission filed a complaint with the BCCSA 
on the basis that the song amounted to hate speech against Indians, a minority group of the South African population. 
The BCCSA found that the broadcast of the song constituted hate speech as defined in section 16 (2)29 of the 
                                                                            
20 Section 16(2). 
21 Johannessen, 1997:142. 
22 Van Wyk, 2002:4. 
23 Section 16 (2). 
24 Burns, 1991. 
25 Section 16 (2). 
26 Van Wyk, 2002:4. 
27 Schenk v United States. 
28 Human Rights Commission of South Africa v SABC. 
29 Section 16 (2). 
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Constitution and in the Broadcasting Code. It found30 that the song promoted hate in sweeping, generalizing and emotive 
language and described Indians as a race as oppressive, humiliating and exploitive. It further found that he combination 
of the accusations constituted an incitement to harm and led to the inference by Indians their safety was at stake, that 
Indians were likely to fear for their security. 
Although the court had little doubt that the song was racist, since it contrasts on race (Blacks) with another race 
(Indians), it emphasized that section 16(2)31 of the Constitution is not aimed at the advocacy of hatred based on race as 
such, but at advocacy of hatred based on race which also constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
The harm cased by racism and xenophobia may not be immediate, and a specific action in and of itself may not 
even be sufficient to cause harm, but it is reasonable and foreseeable that harm is eventual and cumulative, which is why 
it is reasonable to make them illegal. 
 
4. Exceptions to Freedom of Expression 
 
Courts sometimes justify exceptions as speech which causes substantial harm to the public. The value of free speech 
sometimes clashes with other important values of culture. 
Exceptions established by courts include the following: 
• Defamation: Defamation consists of a publication of a statement of alleged fact which is false and which harms 
the reputation of another person. Our right to freedom of expression cause harm to another person. 
• Causing panic: The example of speech which is not protected, because panic, is falsely shouting “fire” in a 
crowded theatre. 
• Fighting words: In the famous case Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire32, The US Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” – those which by their very utterance inflict crying or 
tend to incite and immediate breach of peace33.  
• Incitement to crime: It is a crime to incite someone else to commit a crime, and such speech is not protected. 
• Obscenity: In Miller v California34 the US Supreme Court established a three-pronged test for obscenity 
prohibitions which would not violate the First Amendment: 
a. whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 
b. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and 
c. whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
One controversy over the exception to free speech is whether obscenity causes real harm sufficient to justify 
suppression of free speech. Does viewing obscenity make it more likely that a man will later commit rape, or other acts of 
violence against women? 
• Establishment of Religion: Some speech is restricted because it constitutes the establishment of religion. 
Prayer led by a principal in a public school would violate the establishment clause. Thus a school policy 
prohibiting the principal from leading such prayers would not violate the right of freedom of speech. This is 
controversial to some, who believes that banning prayers in public schools limits an equally important right, 
freedom of religion. This tension illustrates the not uncommon challenge of balancing competing and perhaps 
even irreconcilable values of the Constitution. Do teachers have free speech rights in schools? The discussion 
will briefly look at the situation in schools and how teachers exercise these rights. 
 
5. Free Speech Rights of Public School Teachers 
 
The Constitution protects all persons, no matter what their calling, including public school teachers. Nevertheless, 
because teachers are not only private citizens, but also agents of the state, courts have held that “the rights of the 
teachers in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”. 
 
                                                                            
30 Van Wyk, 2002:10. 
31 Section 16(2). 
32 Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire. 
33 Baker, 1989. 
34 Miller v California. 
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5.1 Speech outside of School 
 
Teachers do not forfeit the right to comment publicly on matters of public importance simply because they accept a public 
school teachers’ position. Teachers cannot be fired or disciplined for statements about matters of public importance 
unless it can be demonstrated that the teacher’s speech created a substantial adverse impact on school functioning. A 
teacher’s off-campus statements regarding the war or participating in an off-campus political demonstration are not 
acceptable bases for job discipline or termination35.  
The Supreme Court in the US recognizes three different types of forums when analyzing freedom of speech 
related to schools and teachers : public forum, limited public forum, and private forum. Public forums include areas such 
as sidewalks, common areas, and areas specifically designated free speech areas. Limited public forums include school 
grounds when opened for expression on a range of views, such as open meetings on public school grounds. The 
classroom is a private forum and as such, speech in the classroom can be limited in numerous ways36.  
In Pickering v Board of Education37, a teacher was fired because he sent a letter to a local newspaper where he 
had criticized the Board of Education concerning past efforts to raise revenue for schools. The Court held that “a 
teacher’s exercise of his right to speech on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from 
public employment”. The Court reasoned that because the letter concerned “a matter of public interest” and there was no 
evidence that it interfered with (1) his or her ability to perform classroom duties or (2) the regular operation of the school, 
the teacher’s rights was no different than those of any other member of the general public. Thus, the teacher could not be 
dismissed for the exercise of his freedom of speech. Speech that harms where youth leaders of political parties and 
Cosatu leaders refer to the fact that they “will die for the revolution and that they are prepared to shoot and to kill” will 
certainly not help to encourage free speech in South Africa.  
Teachers should also be free to attend church or otherwise discuss religion with learners’ off-campus. No adverse 
employment decision, including demotions, reduction in salary or responsibilities, or even threats of discharge may be 
made because of a teacher’s exercise of these rights. 
 
5.2 Speech Inside the Classroom 
 
A teacher appears to speak for the school district when he or she teaches, so the district administration has a strong 
interest in determining the content of the message its teachers will deliver. While courts sometimes protect the academic 
freedom of college and university professors to pursue novel teaching methods and curriculum, these principles do not 
apply with equal force to teachers. It does not violate a teacher’s free speech rights when the district insists, for example, 
that she teaches physics and not political science, or that she cannot lead students in prayer – even though both have the 
result of limiting what the teacher says in the classroom. 
Courts have upheld the authority of school districts to prescribe both course content and teaching. Courts in other 
jurisdictions have ruled that teachers have no free speech rights to include unapproved materials on reading lists38. 
(Baker, 1989:62). 
Although the boundaries are not precise, there are limits to a school district’s ability to control teachers’ 
controversial speech in the classroom. Courts have sometimes ruled that schools may not punish teachers for uttering 
words or concepts in class that are otherwise consistent with the school curriculum, where the school has no legitimate 
pedagogical purpose for the restriction, or where the restriction harms student’s ability to receive important ideas that are 
relevant to the curriculum. 
A school district might choose not the include discussion about a controversial issue in its curriculum and direct 
teachers to avoid the topic unless it arises through student contributions to classroom discussion. Depending on the 
circumstances, a court might well approve such a rule. This assumes that the school is neutral in its implementation of 
the rule. If a school permits anti-war lesson plans but forbids pro-war lesion plans, such action would raise questions 
about viewpoint discrimination. 
The school system does not “regulate” speech as much as it hires that speech. Expression is a teacher’s stock in 
trade, the community she sells to her employer in exchange for a salary. A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class 
                                                                            
35 Curtis, 2000. 
36 Alexander & Alexander, 1998:29. 
37 Pickering v Board of Education. 
38 Baker, 1989:62. 
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can’t use it as a platform for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a traitor, when the approved 
program calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a literature class can’t use Cry, The Beloved 
Country instead, even if Paton’s book better suits the instructor’s style and point of view; a mathematics teacher can’t 
decide that calculus is more important than trigonometry and decide to let Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favour of 
Newton and Leibniz. 
Basically, school administrations are allowed to restrict speech in the classroom based on a desire to present a 
unified message for the students. The rationale is that a teacher appears to speak on behalf of the administration when 
he or she teaches. Unlike other areas of speech, classroom speech can be limited to a certain viewpoint. An example 
involved a recent case in which a school governing body decided to promote Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month. One 
teacher made a bulletin board in his classroom that did not promote the message of tolerance and diversity. The bulletin 
board was found to conflict with the message presented by the administration. The court held that the teacher did not 
have a right to freedom of speech and had to remove the bulletin board39.  
School administrations are allowed to limit speech in furtherance of school curriculum. If that is not a gray enough 
test, I am sure we could fuzz it up a little more. Suffice it to say that when confronted with a district-imposed restriction on 
speech, ask yourself whether the limitation has a reasonable relationship to a teaching purpose. The area that is more 
difficult is: when can a school district limit speech to a single viewpoint? For example, if a school district allows pro-war 
lesson plans, can it limit anti-war lesson plans? As the above case demonstrates, the answer depends on whether the 
limit is reasonably based on a purpose related to teaching. 
 
5.3 Teachers’ Clothing 
 
In the landmark Tinker v. Des Moines 40  Independent Community School District case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
established that public school students have the right to wear armbands in class as an expression of their views on topics 
of public concern. This right may be limited only if there is good reason to believe that the speech would cause a 
substantial and material disruption to education or violate the rights of others. Washington courts have not considered the 
question, but courts in other jurisdictions have differed over whether teachers have the same right as students to display 
personal political messages on their clothing. A court ruled that a New York teacher could not be fired for wearing a black 
armband in protest of the Vietnam War because the armband had caused no classroom disruptions, was not perceived 
as an official statement of the school, did not interfere with instruction, and did not coerce or “arbitrarily inculcate 
doctrinaire views in the minds of the students”. On the other hand, in another case a court upheld a dress code that 
prevented teachers from wearing political buttons in the classroom because school districts have legitimate authority to 
“dissociate themselves from matters of political controversy”41.  
Depending on the precise form of message displayed on the teachers’ clothing, a school may have legitimate 
concern that a teacher’s display of a political message is more likely than a student’s to disrupt the school’s intended 
educational message. For example, a school intending to educate students about the benefits of racial tolerance would 
find its message disrupted by a teacher wearing a Nazi-style armband with swastika. 
Teachers should generally be free to wear clothing, jewelry, indicating their adherence to a religious faith, as long 
as the garb is not proselytizing or disruptive. Numerous courts have held that nuns could not be forbidden from wearing 
their habits while teaching in public schools. Similarly, teachers should be free to wear cross necklaces, inconspicuous 
WWJD (What will Jesus do) bracelets and yarmulkes. Merely employing an individual, who unobtrusively displays her 
religious adherence, is not tantamount to government endorsement of that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement 
or coercion. Nevertheless, items which convey advocacy for a particular religion, or particularly conspicuous religious 
garb that would disrupt the classroom environment, might still be constitutionally prohibited. 
 
 
 
5.4 Bulletin Boards 
 
Bulletin boards or similar spaces may be reserved for the school’s own messaged and kept off-limits to the opposing 
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views of staff.42 
But if a bulletin board is opened to public use, the school must remain neutral, allowing individual messages 
regardless of viewpoint 
 
5.5 On-Campus Conversations with Colleagues 
 
School administrators cannot impose overboard or viewpoint-based rules that restrict how teachers speak with each other 
during breaks or during casual conversations, unless it can be clearly shown that the speech would be harmful to 
workplace functioning. 
 
5.6 On-Campus Demonstrations or Meetings Open to the Public 
 
Public school property is often made available to community groups for meetings or demonstrations. The right of teachers 
to speak about matters of public concern should not be limited simply because the event they wish to speak is held on 
school grounds. 
If the event appears to be more school-related than community-based (such as an anti-war rally attended only by 
students during the school day itself), a principal may be justified in considering teacher participation as part of the 
curriculum. Even for clearly non-curricular events, it may be desirable for teachers to make clear that they are 
participating as individuals and not as representatives of the school. 
 
5.7 Curriculum and Academic Freedom 
 
The authority to determine the content of courses taught in public schools generally lies with the school governing body. 
Thus, teachers may not override the authority of the school governing body by adding or omitting coursework from the 
prescribed curriculum. Nevertheless, the school governing body’s authority to determine the curriculum is not absolute. 
For example, “school governing bodies may not fire teachers for random classroom comments.” The Supreme Court has 
held that allowing school officials to completely exclude a particular subject from the classroom runs the risk of “cast[ing] 
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Thus, the government may not prohibit the teaching of evolution, and it would 
likewise probably be prohibited from proscribing any mention of religion in the schools. As one court states, “[teachers] 
cannot be made to simply read from a script prepared or approved by the [school] board.” 
The Supreme Court in the US has recognized that a teacher’s academic freedom is “a special concern of the First 
Amendment.” Because school governing bodies retain authority to control the curriculum, a public school teacher’s 
academic freedom is likely to be more limited than that of a college or university professor. Public school teachers 
possess some discretion in determining the methods of instruction that they use to teach the required curriculum. Thus, 
courts have held that teachers could not be dismissed for such methods as using a magazine survey that included items 
about sexually explicit matters in her high school speech and sociology classes or using a stimulation technique that 
evoked strong emotions on racial issues to teach about Reconstruction. At least where the teacher’s chosen method of 
instruction does not cause substantial disruption in school order, interfere with others’ rights, or affect the proscribed 
course content teachers have a modicum of discretion in choosing their instruction methods.43  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The right of freedom of expression lies at the basis of a democratic society. Section 16(20) 44  of the Constitution 
underlines this right and places certain forms of expression – including “hate speech” outside constitutional protection. 
Section 16(2)45 set a stringent test to be classified as hate speech. 
The right to freedom of speech is not a right to cause others to live in fear of suffering harm. A decent person 
knows this and will not speak in ways that threaten others who, themselves, do not mean to do any harm. 
Teachers do not unconditionally surrender their constitutional rights once they enter public education. Courts have 
determined, however that there are contexts in which these rights may be subject to limitations or must defer to other 
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interests. Unfortunately, teachers do not gain full protection for speech in the classroom or for speech related to 
personnel matters within the school. 
 
References 
 
Alexander, K, and Alexander, M. 1998. Teacher rights and freedoms. American Public School Law (4th ed, p632-645). Belmont, CA : 
Wadsworth. 
Barkholder, Religious Rights of Teachers in Public Education, 18 Journal of Law and Education 335, 345 (1989). 
Baker, E. 1989. Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
Braun, S. 2004. Democracy off Balance : Freedom of Expression and Hate Propaganda Law in Canada. Toronto : University of Toronto 
Press. 
Burns Suprema Lex : Essays on the Constitutional presented to Marinus Wiechers 35 46. 
Curtis, M.K. 2000. Free Speech, “The People’s Darling privilege.” Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History. North 
Carolina : Duke University Press. 
De Waal, J., Currie, I & Erasmus, P. 2005. The Bill of Right handbook. Cape Town : Juta 
Feinberg, J. 1995. Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion. California : Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Fish, S. 1994. There is no such thing as Free Speech and it’s a good thing too. New York : Oxford University Press. 
Jacobson, D. 1995. Freedom of Speech acts? A response to Langton. Philosophy and Public affairs 24, no 1. 
Jacobson, D. 2000. “Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29 no 3. 
Johannessen, J. 1997. A critical view of the constitutional hate speech provision. South African Journal on human Rights. 1997. Vol 185, 
p137. 
Lyons, D. 1994. Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory. New York : Oxford University Press. 
Mill, J.S. 1978. On Liberty – Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing press. 
South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of South Africa, Act 106 of 1996, Pretoria : Government Printer. 
Sunstein, C. 1994. Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech. New York : Free Press. 
Van Wyk, C. 2002. The Constitutional treatment of hate speech in South Africa. Paper read at the Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law. Bashane 14-20 July 2002. 
 
Court Cases 
 
Chaplinsky vs New Hampshire, 315 US, 568, 572 (1942) 
Human Rights Commission of South Africa v SABC Case No :31/2002 
Kausa v Minister of Home Affairs Namibia 
R v Keegstra. SCR 227-228 (1990) 
Miller v California, 413 US. 15,24 (1973) 
Pickering v Board of Education,391 US 563 (1968) 
Schenk v United States, 354 US. 476,512 (1959) 
Tinker v Des Miones Indep Cmty. Sch. Distr., 393 US 503, 506 (1969) 
